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In the Supretne Court 
of the State of Utah 
LOA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ELIZABETH F. SYME, 
Administratrix of the Estate of Bailey 
Syme, Deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 8547 
The respondent generally incorporates herein the 
statement of facts set forth in appellants' brief as re-
flecting the record in this proceeding. May we, how-
ever, reiterate certain portions thereof in addition to 
certain parts of the record to afford a clear understand-
ing of the respondent's position and the basis of the 
holding of Judge A. H. Ellett in the lower court. 
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For reference purposes, the record herein will he 
cited as follows: (BR) as indicating the appellant's brief; 
(D) as indicating the deposition of the appellant; and 
(T) as indicating the transcript. 
Initially, the appellant frequently traveled and was 
familiar with the portion of U.S. 91 where this intersec-
tion is situated and where the mishap occurred. (D-10). 
Some 600 feet directly south of the (CT" intersection, a 
sign indicated to northbound traffic that a roadway 
leading east to the City of Draper was directly ahead. 
(BR-2). The appellant was proceeding north at a speed 
of from 50 to 55 miles per hour where the speed limit 
was 50 miles per hour. (BR-2). It was then night, but 
visibility was good. (BR-5). The road surface was wet, 
but not puddled, and the surrounding terrain was of 
open farm lands without any concealing growth or im-
provements which would obstruct or interfere with the 
vision or observation of drivers proceeding north, as was 
the appellant. (BR-4-5) Both of the vehicles involved 
in this accident had the headlights on at the time of the 
accident (T -18) 
The appellant stated in her deposition that she :first 
observed the deceased's automobile when it was ttstraight" 
in front of her and when deceased's automobile was at 
a distance from her of only ((between twenty or thirty 
feet" and proceeding west across appellant's lane of traf-
fic. (D-13-17) Appellant stated, when asked the speed 
at which deceased was proceeding 
(CA. He wasn't going very fast. He was just bare-
ly moving, if not standing still, practically. 
He looked to me, when I first seen him, like 
he was almost parked, but he must have been 
moving a little." ( D-14) 
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and she thereafter made a guess as the deceased's speed of 
((ten or twenty miles an hour, probably." (D-14) 
The appellant's automobile collided and came into 
contact with deceased's car somewhere in the area of the 
right door, (D-14) and at a point on the pavement close 
to the west shoulder of the northbound traffic lanes of 
U.S. 91 (D-14). 
No issue is, by this proceeding, before the court as 
to the deceased's negligence. 
From appellant's proposed proof, the physical evi-
dence would establish that the decedant traveled west 
from the said stop sign 30 feet before arriving at the 
easterly edge of the pavement of U.S. 91, across the 24 
foot easterly lane of North bound traffic and across the 
16 foot westerly lane of north bound traffic and his 
front wheels had gone west of the westerly edge of the 
pavement at the time of impact-a total distance in ex-
cess of 70 feet-at a speed that was ((barely moving." 
(BR-1-2) 
This movement of the deceased was clearly discerni-
ble by witnesses who were proceeding under the same 
circumstances and conditions as the appellant, but who 
were behind her ((a block" and who had, therefore, a 
proportionate disadvantage of observation. (B-5) In fact, 
one of the witnesses appellant proposed to call and who 
was following appellant ((a block" would have testified, 
according to appellant, that he observed the movement 
of the deceased from a point 3 00 feet east of the stop 
sign right up to the time of impact (BR-4) 
The foregoing evidence adduced by the published de-
position of the appellant, stipulations of counsel and cer-
tain informal proffers made by counsel, which are not 
5 
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here controverted, formed the fact basis for Judgt. '1.-
lett's ruling that as a matter of law no facts were _I;Ie-
sented which would support the counter claim of the 
respondent and that the appellant was guilty of con 
butory negligence as a matter of law. Appeal was ta~ .1 
by the plaintiff on the issue of contributory neglige.i . e 
and therefater the defendant cross appealed from the 
ruling on her counter claim. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT CONSTI-
TUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO HER 
IN JURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT NO. III. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECEASED COULD 
NOT BE CHARGED WITH WILFUL OR WANTON 
MISCONDUCT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT CONSTI-
TUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As recited in the statement of facts, the intersec-
tion with which we are here concerned is a uT" inter-
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sr. ~n on a divided highway. The Draper road 
intersects only the northbound traffic on U.S. 91 which, 
in turn, is separated from southbound traffic by an island 
• ·r.- ;feet in width. This physical condition is such that a 
t ;;~.lYer proceeding north as appellant, has to concern him-
S'..Jfi only and exclusively with traffic moving in the same 
d~rection or with vehicles entering the highway in front 
oi him at the intersection. The terrain is flat, the high-
w 1y is perfectly straight and there are no obstruction of 
any nature which would prevent northbound drivers 
from observing the movement of other vehicles approach-
ing, or at the intersection. 
Under these physical circumstances, the uncontro-
verted evidence is that the appellant was northbound on 
U.S. 91 in the westerly lane, traveling between 50 
and 55 at about 11:00 P.M. and completely failed to 
observe the deceased's automobile or its headlights until 
it was ((straight ahead" of appellant and ((barely mov-
ing." This, even though the deceased's automobile had 
its headlights on and had proceeded at least 70 feet past 
the stop sign and in front of appellant. Appellant has ad-
mitted that she was looking ahead prior to the colli-
sion, and, as stat.ed in Smith v. Bennett, 1 Utah 2d 224, 
265 P. 2d 401, 404, 
(( ... there was but one demand upon plaintiff's at-
tention. There is no room for a reasonable differ-
ence of opinion as to where her attention should 
have been concentrated; ... that she failed to use 
due care in doing so is manifest from the evidence." 
The lower court has rightly concluded that this ad-
mitted complete failure of the appellant to observe de-
7 
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ceased's automobile under obvious circumstances, consti-
tuted negligence as a matter of law. 
((A motorist must use his eyes and see seasonably 
that which is open and apparent. In other words, 
the duty of looking ahead imposes upon the driv-
er, whether of an automobile or of domestic ani-
mals, the obligation to see whatever there may be 
in the line of his vision, for a reasonable distance, 
which will affect his driving, and, if his view is 
unobstructed, he will be held in law to have seen 
(vehicles) on the street in front of him, and will 
be deemed negligent as a matter of law if he fails 
to see that which should have been obvious." 1 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and 
Practic Section Section 682. 
One patent error in the appellant's position here 
arises by reason of her proposed proof. Counsel signifi-
cantly fails to comment on appellant's failure to keep a 
proper lookout and yet proposed at pre-trial to rely on 
the testimony of witnesses following ((a block" behind 
appellant to establish the negligence of the deceased. In 
other words, appellant is silent in her brief on the fact 
that she looked but didn't see the perfectly obvious, even 
in the face of the fact that the very witnesses she intended 
to rely upon to establish her case, distinctly observed 
from a position a block behind appellant all of the move-
ments made by deceased's vehicle from a point 300 feet 
east of the stop sign up to the point of impact. This, we 
feel, is a real dilemma for appellant and properly and 
completely establishes either that she was not looking 
immediately prior to the accident, or that she was look-
ing and failed to observe the obvious. Either of which 
events establish that the appellant was guilty of contri-
butory negligence as a matter of law. 
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Appellant cites authority in her brief which alleged-
ly establishes that the issue of contributory negligence 
should in every instance be submitted to the jury. This, 
of course, is not the rule. (See Hicks v. Skinner, 113 
Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514. Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 
.505, 201 Pac. (2d) 495, and Covington v. Ca.rpenter, 4 
Utah (2d) 378, 294 Pac. (2d) 788). 
It seems well established by the foregoing authority 
and well settled in Utah that a motion for a directed ver-
dict will properly be granted if two fact elements are 
present in a given case as a matter of law: 
( 1) That the plaintiff is negligent, and 
( 2) That such negligence proximately contributed 
to cause his or her own injury. (See also ·Martin v. Stevens, 
(Utah), 243 Pac. (2d) 747. 
In the case now before the court, there exists no 
necessity to labor questions of human judgment. If three 
occupants of motor vehicles following appellant ua block" 
were able to clearly observe the movement of deceased's 
vehicle for a distance of some 370 feet up to the point of 
impact and the appellant, on the other hand, did not see 
deceased's vehicle at night, with lights burning, until it 
was directly in front of her ubarely moving" at a distance 
of only uzo to 30 feet" then she was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law. The first element of ((negligence" 
to sustain a directed verdict is obviously present, as found 
by Judge Ellett. 
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POINT NO. II 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT PROXIMATE-
LY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO HER INJURIES 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellant was fully familiar with that portion of 
U.S. 91 where the accident occurred, having driven the 
same portion thereof weekly for some period of time. In 
addition, the presence of the Draper road was constantly 
brought to the attention of northbound traffic by rea-
son of an appropriate sign on the highway. With this 
knowledge in appellant, she negligently failed to observe 
the deceased's vehicle proceed some 70 odd feet past the 
stop sign and directly in front of her at a speed which, 
she stated, was ((barely moving," until it was within u20 
or 3 0 feet." 
If we give this ((barely moving" a speed even as high 
as 1 0 miles per hour it is elementary that the appellant 
would travel a distance at 50 miles per hour equal to five 
times that which the deceased covered. In other words, 
after it was evident that deceased had passed the stop 
sign, deceased traveled at least 70 feet while at the same 
time appellant traveled five times as far or at least 3 SO 
feet. If we take her speed at 55 miles per hour, she 
would have traveled at least 385 feet. In this distance, 
and after deceased had proceeded past the stop sign, ap-
pellant could have come to a complete stop in approxi-
mately 184 feet and had 166 feet left to the point of 
impact, or she could have proceeded within an additional 
166 feet, nearly half way to the point of impact, and 
still been able to come to a complete stop prior to the 
point of impact. Further, during this 350 feet, the ap-
10 
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pellant could reasonably have reduced her speed com-
mensurate with the situation then confronting her or she 
could reasonably have turned her car to the other north-
bound lane of traffic. 
Of course, none of these precautionary measures 
were taken, because the appellant was negligent in fail-
ing to observe the deceased's headlights or his vehicle un-
til it was directly in front of her, ((barely moving" and 
at a distance of only ((twenty or thirty feet." Under 
these irrefutable admissions of the appellant, her negli-
gence, as a matter of law, must be deemed to have proxi-
mately contributed to this accident and contributed to 
the injuries of which she complains. 
As generally stated in the Utah cases and reiterated 
by the text writers, 
(( ... the rule in automobile accident cases ... IS 
that any negligence of one, seeking redress for 
injuries to his person or property through the 
wrong of another contributing directly or proxi-
mately to such injury, to such an extent that but 
for it he would not have been injured, will defeat 
a cause of action founded on the primary negli-
gence of the defendant, brought by the plaintiff 
... " (See 4 Brashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law and Practice Section 27 61.) 
We respectfully submit that the failure of the ap-
pellant to observe the vehicle of the deceased for some 
320 odd feet did, as a matter of law, proximately cause 
or contribute to the accident and the injuries about 
which appellant complains. 
11 
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POINT NO. III. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECEASED COULD 
NOT BE CHARGED WITH WILFUL OR WANTON 
MISCONDUCT. 
Here, as on the previous two points, the appellant 
ignores the significance and weight of her own testimony. 
Initially, she assumes that the deceased was operating his 
vehicle recklessly. Her comments in this regard include 
an inuendo that the decedent had partaken of alcoholic 
beverages notwithstanding the fact that on page 15 of 
her brief she says: uin this case there was no evidence 
of intoxication on the part of (the deceased.)" There-
fore, she is left with the charge that the decedent drove 
through a stop sign at a speed of 40 miles per hour to 
substantiate her allegation of wilful and wanton mis-
conduct. The evidence as to the speed would apparently 
be adduced by a witness, 0. F. Stanley, who was traveling 
about ua block" behind the appellant, and his observa-
tion, according to the brief of appellant, was made when 
the deceased was approximately 300 feet east of the stop 
sign. In direct contradiction of this testimony, appellant 
herself stated that the speed of the deceased when first 
observed was ubarely moving." It seems to us, therefore, 
that the speed at which the deceased was traveling would, 
as a matter of law, be excluded from that category labeled 
uwilful and wanton misconduct," for 
(( ... the injury must either have been intentionally 
inflicted or produced by act so grossly negligent as 
to exhibit reckless disregard for the safety of 
others." ( 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile 
Law & Practice Sectio11 2771.) 
12 
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Certainly, ccbarely moving" is not such a speed. 
The next point which the appellant raises to estab-
lish the wilful and wanton misconduct of the deceased 
was the fact that he had proceeded through a stop sign. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the deceased did proceed 
through a stop sign without stopping, this, as a matter of 
fact, could not ((proximately" cause the accident. It 
seems to go without saying that proceeding through a 
stop sign is not wilful and wanton misconduct, as ap-
pellant seems to think that it is, and we know of no case 
which would support her contention. No presumption 
can be made that such failure to observe constitutes wil-
ful and wanton misconduct, and no case has been cited 
by the appellant which establishes the rule to be the 
contrary. As a matter of fact, decedents are presumed 
to have acted reasonably and carefully as ordinarily pru-
dent persons in operating their vehicles on the highway. 
Here, of course, decedent cannot testify, but the physical 
facts are such, and the undisputed evidence establishes, 
that he had proceeded at least 70 feet past the stop sign at 
the time of the impact and was traveling, when observed 
by appellant, at a speed that was ccbarely moving." In 
addition, he had practically negotiated his vehicle en-
tirely across the wide northbound lanes of U.S. 91. We 
must further mark well that it was the decedent who was 
struck - not the appellant. It was the fact that ap-
pellant failed to observe and was operating her vehicle 
at a speed which did not allow her to stop her vehicle 
within her lights that caused this unfortunate occurrence. 
Under the foregoing facts, the lower court rightly 
held that there was no evidence which would establish 
13 
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a jury issue as to whether or not the deceased had opera ted 
his vehicle in a wilful or wanton manner. 
On the other hand, can be ignore the appellant's ad-
mitted failure to observe the obvious-her speed-the 
fact that witnesses a block behind her were fully able to 
make competent observations-her failure to make any 
attempt to avoid this collision. Surely, if wilful and wan-
ton misconduct was a factor contributing to the injuries 
sustained by the appellant, appellant's own acts, as a 
matter of law, would properly be characterized in this 
category. 
HWhen a party wilfully or wantonly contributes, 
as a proximate cause to his own injury, he can-
not recover, even though the defendant also acted 
in a wilful and wanton manner. If the parties 
were equally, in the same class, to blame in pro-
ducing the injury, neither can recover." (Spiller 
v. Griffen, 95 S.E. 133, 109 S.C. 78, 4 Blashfield 
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice Sec-
tion 2776.) 
The appellant takes comfort in making an analogy 
to decided cases on the statutes relating to involuntary 
manslaughter, but cases are substantially different as to 
facts from the case now before this court. In addition, 
these cases relate to criminal violations and the rules and 
the construction placed upon the applicable statutes have 
no relation to our problem. In State vs. Lingman, 97 
Utah 180, 91 Pac. 2d 457 the defendant was traveling at 
an excessive speed and the physical facts were such that 
the excessive speed was established as a matter of law 
and that such excessive speed would have substantially 
caused or contributed to the death of the person struck by 
14 
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the defendant. And, again, in State vs. Barker, 113 Utah 
514, 196 Pac. 2d 723 the facts were such that the de-
fendant proceeded through a stop sign and drove directly 
into the care in which decedent was a passenger. It seems 
to us extremely significant that both the Lingman case 
and the Barker case were reversed by this court and no 
discussions whatever was had regarding ((wilful and wan-: 
ton misconduct." No precedent is set forth in either of 
these decisions which would in any way support the posi-
tion of the appellant in this proceeding. And, when 
placed in proper context with the facts therein involved, 
the limited application of the rule set forth in these in-
voluntary manslaughter cases is self-evident. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, and the rules 
announced by this court, the appellant herein was con-
tributorily negligent in the operation of her vehicle as a 
matter of law and the decision of the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
15 
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